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This paper discusses changes in the agro-food markets with respect to 
the incentives to co-operation between farmers. The 'Sixth Reason' de-
notes that the historical reasons as such are no longer valid. It is con-
cluded that each of the five historical reasons has taken on a meaning 
which is different from the past. The Sixth Reason indicates that each 
of the five historical reasons are to be regarded in a changed context. 
Thus the Sixth Reason consists of the following five elements: 
• Co-operation is to create a firm that is to act as an interface between 
highly sophisticated and globalised food industries and ecologically 
sustainable farming in economically sustainable rural areas. 
• Co-operation is a means to create a network economy which is indis-
pensable to make fast moving technologies accessible. 
• Safe and diversified food products require systems of passport produc-
tion from the grass-roots to the final consumer; cooperatives are well 
equipped to manage such production systems. 
• In more liberalised market conditions co-operatives can lower trans-
action costs to realise a diversified risk management among farmers. 
• Diversification is an expression of entrepreneurial activity; entrepre-
neurship is expressed in new forms of co-operation. 
A number of new generation co-operatives are discussed. Some were 
newly engineered, some were recently re-engineered. It is concluded that 
the historical co-operative principles are no longer valid. The NGC is 
the expression of smaller groups underlying homogeneity. Certain prin-
ciples are reinvented. Others are about to disappear. Among these are 
open membership or free entry, and the one man one vote rule if there are 
differences in the enterprises controlled by the members. 
Introduction 
When studying the theory and practice of co-operatives, particularly in 
agribusiness, the student inevitably is confronted with the issue of the 
co-operative principles. Apparently founders and leaders of co-opera-
tives had to adhere to structures and rules of conduct for co-operative 
managers and members without which the co-operative would go astray 
and thus would be in danger of loosing its 'raison d'être'. All the empiri-
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cal evidence and practical experience from history brought co-operative 
organisations to a number of principles (Inter-national Joint Project, 
1995). These were meant as an advanced warning: 'If you, co-operative 
leader, do not adhere to such and such rules you will surely fail. Learn 
from history how to set up and control a co-operative'. 
Sometimes people and organisations went even further. The principles 
became rules: 'If you do not stick to these principles you should not call 
yourself a co-operative'. Yet we see in the last decade of the 20th century 
the birth of co-operatives which are structured in such a way that many 
a co-operative idealist would hesitate to call them co-operatives. If 
questioned 'Are you a co-operative?' the member of such a co-operative 
would probably respond by 'I guess this is as close as we can get'. 
First, five historical reasons for co-operatives are discussed. Then, I 
argue why a good deal of these co-operatives features are now behind 
the horizon. Third, the Sixth Reason is described. Finally, the question 
is asked as to whether new principles are likely to emerge in the future. 
Historical Reasons for Co-operation 
Undoubtedly the need for countervailing power has been the most impor-
tant historical reason for why farmers and horticultural producers have 
set up their co-operative enterprises. Co-operatives were created at a 
time when farmers began to integrate in the market economy. Their trade 
partners were private companies with superior market information who 
enjoy monopoly power vis-à-vis the farmers. By joining forces, the farm-
ers were able to influence the market structure and the market behaviour 
of the buyers and/or suppliers. Many examples exist where cartels were 
dismantled due to co-operative firms (CFs) entering the market1. Thus, 
cut-throat price competition among farmers was mitigated and replaced 
by functional and quality-oriented competition. 
When considering this First Reason for cooperatives it must be kept in 
mind that at that time markets for agricultural products and food 
products were, apart from crises, buoyant. From the point of view of farm 
inputs such as farm implements and fertiliser, the demand by farmers 
was growing strongly. Henceforth, a Second Reason for farmers to start 
co-operatives was to gain access to industrially produced goods and 
services. What should be mentioned in particular is the access to credit 
at favourable interest rates. The latter example is still today clearly 
visible in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
There is little doubt that in The Netherlands co-operative banking has 
been a crucial factor in agribusiness and farm development. 
Like all other co-operatives, the co-operative banks could realise 
their goals due to economies of scale. By the sheer large scale character-
istic of their activities they were able to bring the steady outflow of 
capital from farming and rural communities to a halt. Especially co-op-
erative banks may be seen as forms of organised trust underlying mod-
ernisation and expansion of agribusiness. 
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The realisation of efficiency in processing co-operatives was and still 
is essential. Almost all agricultural products are of a bulky nature. 
Therefore unit costs of processing decrease sharply by expanding the 
operations of the CF. Hence, efficiency by economies of scale is the Third 
Reason for the creation of a co-operative. Co-operative auctions in 
flower, fruit and vegetable marketing have as their core business the 
market management under conditions of transparency. Market manage-
ment yields competitive conditions so that the price system is efficient 
and in order that the right incentives are realised. Of course, intensive 
competition and prevention of monopoly positions is a prerequisite 
number one. 
Time and time again it has been proven that accumulation of supplies 
(or suppliers) causes accumulation of demand (or buyers). Therefore co-
operative auctions represent a very good example of both effectiveness 
and efficiency due to size of operations. 
The Fourth Reason for a co-operative is risk management. No doubt 
CFs had to find their place in the market by gradual quality improve-
ment involving all members. So on the one hand CFs reduced competition 
among members as was discussed under the First Reason, but on the other 
hand competition was based on such marketing elements as quality of 
farm products. It helped farmers to introduce continuity in delivery and 
achievable quality standards. This contributed to the farmers' 
knowledge the market and more stable conditions of investment. In 
addition, it must be said that there has always been an element of 
mental solidarity among co-operative members. 
There is certainly a transaction cost element behind risk management 
and solidarity. CFs are more able to mitigate opportunistic behaviour 
and uncertainty. When CFs integrate with farmers, there is less fear 
that one of the parties will behave in an exploitative manner. Because a 
CFs are owned by its patrons it is less likely to default on agreements. 
The Fifth Reason, finally, improvement of members' income and the 
rural economy. This aspect was the desired outcome of all activities men-
tioned above. In particular, however, it was realised by managing excess 
supply. The management of excess supply was in virtually all markets 
solely the activity of co-operatives. 
Most of these reasons are not as acute as they once were. However, in 
many market structures the need for co-operation would reappear if CFs 
would disappear. 
Changing Market Conditions 
Co-operative agribusiness is operating under very different conditions in 
the industrialised market economies as compared with conditions when 
co-operatives were still social and business innovations. In, for instance, 
The Netherlands and Denmark co-operative agribusiness is character-
ised by export-orientation, an increasingly internationalised industry 
and pursuit of direct foreign investments. 
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The CFs are commonly U-form, that is to say they do not integrate 
different main products into conglomerate co-operative companies. Dairy 
co-operatives are not involved in meat, and potatoes are not marketed 
together with grains by one CF. The farm supply co-operatives are usu-
ally more diversified. In countries with sparsely populated areas like 
Ireland, it is more common to integrate more products in one co-operative 
structure. 
Under normal market circumstances co-operatives play the role of 
price leader. As a matter of fact they almost automatically become price 
leaders if they are founded for the reason of creating countervailing 
power in the market. A second reason is that they become price leaders 
because of their cost leadership. The costs in co-operative processing are 
decreased by efficiency. Efficiency-strategies always have been of key 
importance to co-operatives in agriculture. In most processing firms in 
agribusiness a one percent decrease in costs has the same effect as a 10 
percent increase in demand. Co-operatives naturally would raise prices 
paid to members according to their performance. Henceforth the price to 
be paid to the farmer by the CF has a buffer function to the CF in that a 
price leader-CF will distribute its results on the basis of the proportion-
ality rule. Risks are expressed in price. In other words, price performs 
the income and risk allocation role. When looked at from the point of 
view of the CF as a business, this buffer is comparable to risk bearing 
equity share capital in an IOF. Price being a performance allocator, i t 
can be said that members share liability and risk on a transaction basis. 
Adverse market results in first instance means lower prices to the mem-
bers. To them it means lower returns on investments in their farm (see 
Figure 1). Own equity in the CF, however, can have lower solvency than 
in IOFs because CFs are backed by members. Increasingly co-operatives 
seek for more permanent forms of risk bearing capital. Mostly the inter-
ests or dividends paid on such capital are related to capital markets. 
Thus they represent fixed, accountable costs to CFs, leaving risks to be 
born by members. 
Figure 1 Difference between IOFs and Co-operatives 
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When markets become more international and competition more inten-
sive, traditional co-operative price leadership in the sense of market 
correction loses its traditional rationale. When standardised qualities of 
the raw product can be imported or exported, and the EU or world mar-
kets are effective, CFs can only pay a better price than IOFs to their 
members when at least one of the following conditions apply: transaction 
costs are low, and quality is superior, in the sense that it better fits in the 
value-added chain system. Each of these leads to better margins for the 
CF and thus better dividends to the members. 
If the CF has the lowest costs by far in comparison with competitors or 
when the CF has a market position, e. g., with branded products which 
brings it in a monopolistic position, this means that membership repre-
sents extra-value. Such extra-value is not likely maintained under condi-
tions of free entry of new members. Instead CFs which enjoy monopoly 
powers will not continue to follow free entrance policies. Members will be 
accepted on the basis of market opportunities and are expected to share 
risks by capital investment which is proportional to the amount of 
product to be processed and marketed by the CF on their behalf. Members 
try to avoid that value added operations on behalf of themselves are 
diluted. 
Monopoly power is mostly based on market positions in the consumer 
market. In agribusiness they are closely related to specialised resources. 
The most crucial resource is genetics. For many products the genetic basis 
is essentially determining costs of production, costs of managing the inte-
grated chain, costs of processing and consumer acceptance. So monopoly 
power in the agro-food sector is gained by moving to either the starting 
point or to the end of the chain. Or to both, of course. 
CFs (and their members) which have achieved such monopoly power 
will normally limit production and limit the entry of new members. 
But the market laws also work the other way round. Farmers operat-
ing in a market with stiff competition for their products or where the 
suppliers of their inputs are in intense competition will judge the per-
formance of their CF on normal market parameters: price, quality, serv-
ice, new market opportunities on behalf of inputs engaged in the farm 
enterprise and returns on capital 'invested' by the CF's members. 
Closely related to the foregoing is the observation that co-operatives 
by their very nature cover an over-normal transaction span in the market 
chain. Farmer-members begin to 'correct' their market partners at both 
ends of the agro-food system. They continue to seek a better position by 
integrating both forward and backward. It is also necessary to take into 
account the special nature of farming. 
In farming long periods with low returns are not unusual. Therefore, 
farmer-members are inclined to seek continuity in their CF. Investments 
made in times of depression pay off in times of market booms. For co-
operative members this is only realised if they commit themselves. Thus 
co-ops can become monopsonists due to member commitment. This 
phenomenon is underpinned by the fact that usually the co-ops have 
realised considerable economies of scale in processing which makes the 
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entrance of new competitors difficult because of large investments 
needed. That CF then has a monopoly or a monopsony position. If CFs are 
achieving real competitive advantage which provides them with 
market leader positions, members will not want to restrict their CF to 
the home market nor to processing and marketing the members' product 
only. Members rather will let their CF expand with foreign members or 
let it, be it partly, go as an international IOF. 
When a CF becomes a monopsonist there is at first glance a danger too, 
namely that the CF takes on a monopsonistic position vis-à-vis its own 
members because there are no other firms which compete for the mem-
bers' product. Should not the farmer who sees his product processed by 
only one CF fear that the absence of competition in the market may even-
tually cost him his market position? Such conditions are more likely to 
occur when markets are protected from foreign competition by market 
policies of the government. Under conditions of international trade lib-
eralisation such situations are likely erased, however. Notably the 
effects of the GATT negotiations on international competition will be 
open markets for foods and agricultural products. The effect for farmers 
will be that a wider range of firms will compete for their raw material 
if their farming is price competitive. Competition on quality and de-
creasing transaction costs will likewise become more important. 
There is a condition under which farmers and their CFs work in a way 
so that market competition is excluded. No other firms are interested in 
buying the farm produce and the CF is not allowed to stop processing the 
members' production. The reasons can essentially be twofold. One reason 
is that the firm is highly specialised and cost of entry at the processor's 
(= CFs) level is prohibitively high. In this case the competitive position 
of the CF in the consumer market will determine the returns on invest-
ment for the co-operative: both at the level of the farm and the CF. The 
other reason can be that the CF and the co-operative members have built 
a strong system in which transaction costs are so low as to create a 
monopoly power for the system as a whole. In this case the entrepreneu-
rial power of the co-operative market system will be decisive for the 
future which is ultimately in the hands of the farmer-owner/investor. 
The land rents have an opportunity value which is determined by other 
productions and the willingness of farmers to invest is determined by the 
opportunity cost of capital outside the co-operative farming business as 
compared with its returns within. 
The reason to co-operate under these conditions will be that otherwise 
the competitive farmer cannot reach the market, but because participa-
tion in his CF will yield better returns than just selling the raw product 
or than from stopping farming altogether. 
Finally, co-operatives originally were established on the concepts of 
countervailing, 'negotiation-driven' power and of partial integration by 
which the markets between farmers and their CF were replaced by 
'system-driven' markets. In the 'system-driven' markets market prices 
are more or less based on formula pricing, the elements in the formula 
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being the performance of the CF in its own market, risks, costs, quality, 
equity formation and member liability. 
The markets in which the CFs' performance was to be realised were 
mostly 'negotiation-driven' markets. The members' 'system-driven' mar-
kets were normally based on homogeneous membership. Besides, as most 
agricultural inputs and products are of a bulky nature the economies of 
scale to be gained stimulated open membership and homogeneous mem-
ber-business. This has changed considerably. In the first place most CFs 
have developed strategic alliances, joint ventures, and forward and 
backward integration contracts with their suppliers or buyers. The result 
is that the agro-food market has changed towards a 'system-driven' 
right through the chain. In the second place more segmentation in the 
market is creating member segmentation. In the study 'The Co-operative 
Enterprise - Perspectives of Development in Denmark Towards the Year 
2010' an example is given in which eggs are segmented into cage eggs, free 
range eggs, non-cage eggs and ecological eggs. Each of these are produced 
by four different producer groups. 
Such an example shows that the markets have also changed in the 
sense that the consumer behaviour is felt more directly at the farm level. 
The characteristics of investment in the CF and the farm are becoming 
more specialised and of a short term nature. Therefore we see that equity 
formation by unallocated reserves is less fashionable and is being 
replaced by member investments with higher rates of depreciation. 
The Sixth Reason for Co-operation - The Historical Reasons Revisited 
Have the historical reasons for co-operation lost their meaning for the 
efficient, competitive farms? From the preceding paragraphs it can be 
concluded that open, competitive markets for agricultural products are 
the effect of a trend towards globalisation and liberalisation of 
international trade policies. Many observers conclude from this 
development that there is no need for co-operatives in the classical 
sense, since market information is precluding monopolist behaviour. 
Firms cannot protect their markets and governments will remove 
sheltering effects by abolishing protective national trade policies. 
This is not to say that farmers can survive financially without co-
operation. When governmental trade policies are liberalised it is still 
impossible for individual farmers to influence the market behaviour of 
industrial trade partners in the market chain. It is hoped that interna-
tional competition will create more market opportunities. On the other 
hand during recent years there has been a strong trend towards concentra-
tion in the food retail industry. Not only have retail organisations in 
their country of origin merged to the effect that three to five supermar-
ket chains may control 50-70 percent of food retail sales, the supermar-
ket enterprises have also become international. Moreover, there are sev-
eral instances of retail chains operating in purchasing organisations and 
developing products jointly. The Federation of Danish Cooperatives con-
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eludes (1996, p. 4):"There is an increase in the use of private labels, the 
chains strive to differentiate in relation to each other by establishing 
their own individual product profiles. Often, the retail chains are at the 
head of a considerable portion of the development activities regarding 
these products. When the chains became larger and international, their 
strength increases face to face with the societies supplying the food". 
There are, however, new opportunities for farmers to develop market-
ing structures by which farmers can keep pace with new demands of mar-
kets. Among these are differentiation, vertical integration, alliances, 
joint ventures and collaboration between co-operatives across the 
national borders. Therefore the historical First Reason has obtained a 
new content. This is the creation of a new interface between the highly 
sophisticated and globalised food industries and the primary farms, 
which seek sustainable methods in a sustainable rural economy. 
A similar observation holds for the historical Second Reason. Co-op-
erative banking provides us with a good example. On the one hand, with 
the exception of newly established market economies in Eastern Europe, 
farmers have all desired the bank products made available to them. So 
at first glance it would seem that it is no longer acutely necessary for 
farmers to have co-operative banks to gain access to financial markets. 
On the other hand, the capital markets still need re-engineering to 
operate efficiently towards the farm sector. This is true when looking a t 
co-operatives themselves. Co-operatives are in need of permanent, risk-
bearing capital first from members, but possibly also from non-member 
sources. In the last case members do not want to give away their control. 
Therefore, farmers would prefer other capital markets for their co-
operatives rather than the stock exchange where they have to comply 
with general rules concerning ROI and allocations of plants and business 
centres. 
Co-operatives are also bound to certain regions where the businesses of 
the members are located. This means that the Second Reason for co-
operation, namely the access to capital and money markets is also 
supplemented by a Sixth Reason. With changing market conditions for 
farm products as mentioned before and the steep rise in the use of infor-
mation technology, the financial markets become the heart of the econ-
omy. Each sector will make its own use of these opportunities. Farming is 
characterised by varying scale and by great variation in natural condi-
tions over relatively short distances. Therefore the financial servicing 
has to be adjusted to the various farm sectors and to regional differences. 
Co-operative banking can contribute to farm adjustment by making new 
services available and by assisting the members to develop strategies 
and to manage these. For banking the core-business will be the manage-
ment of information flows on financial markets and economic develop-
ments that are relevant at individual firm level and at industry level. 
Such networks need the input of both the co-operative banks and their 
members. A good example is provided by the German car industry BMW. 
They realised that individual freedom is a meaningful concept only if i t 
is in harmony with freedom of others. Therefore, a 'Co-operative Traffic 
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Management System' was developed. A co-operatively financed system 
was installed by the car industries, government, municipalities and 
transport organisations to develop sophisticated computerised informa-
tion system for managing the logistics of cars, buses, trains etc. The 
system should take into account the functioning of public and private 
transport under the condition of road space, public transport capacity and 
environment as the scarce resources. Such a co-operatively managed 
system can only succeed when all partners contribute. The concerns are 
with up-to-date information supply on plans and restrictions faced with. 
So the new content of the Second Reason is the creation of a network 
economy by which access and keeping up with fast moving techniques can 
be secured - both to the CF and the member firms 
Under conditions of open competitive markets the historical Third 
Reason does not seem to be affected. Probably it is significant for process-
ing the farm product and inputs at lowest cost today as it was during the 
genesis of co-operatives. However, new requirements emerge. The new 
demand is that diversification and variety at the consumer level not 
only affects the processing but also the production methods, plant breeds 
and animal breeds at the farm level; 'passport' or system-integrated 
production is the new element added to the historical Third Reason. 
Here, we should mention the role of technology, and especially that of 
biotechnology in reshaping the agro-industrial complex. Seed and agro-
chemicals, primary agriculture, and food processing are more likely to be 
co-ordinated to achieve food with functional requirements matching con-
sumer preferences for health, convenience and low cost. As goverments 
withdraw from funding agricultural research, co-operatives have to bear 
the costs of R&D, if they want to reap the benefits of process and produce 
innovation. But it is here that economices of scale appear to be relevant. 
The huge costs and risks of biotechnology require large scale of operation 
and purposeful strategic alliances. Access to new technology is an irre-
versible option for co-operatives if they want to penetrate the food 
chain (Kyriokopoulos et al., 1996) 
The historical Fourth Reason is risk management. In the past this had 
to do with member solidarity, especially concerning the handling of sur-
pluses. There is little doubt that the changing conditions on the food and 
agricultural markets have changed the risk profiles of co-operatives and 
their members. As food markets become more mature, branding and mar-
ket segmentation has set the scene. At consumer markets the profit mar-
gins are higher with more value added. However, risks are also higher. 
As CFs are becoming larger it is their 'natural' business to integrate for-
ward and to expand geographically. The risks are bom by the members. 
Their risk profile is changing fast with forward integration. At the same 
time forward integration is a means to reduce risks run by farmers as 
trade liberalisation decreased the effect of income protection policies by 
the government. 
Increased risk has in some sectors stimulated new forms of ownership 
and special company structures with subsidiary companies and holding 
companies (Federation of Danish Cooperatives, 1996; van Dijk and 
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Mackel, 1994). New forms of risk management while a variety of busi-
ness alliances and abstracts emerge is the present content of the Fourth 
Reason. 
Historically, co-operatives accepted all products delivered to them. 
The management's job was to find market outlets and realise the best 
prices possible. This need to take all produce has been dealt with in 
three ways (van Dijk and Mackel, 1994): 
• Maximising the use of public support measures to minimise commer-
cial risk, (e.g., grain co-operatives in France and their use of the 
intervention/subsidised export schemes); 
• Trading freely with a range of suppliers using price as the method of 
procurement rather than group discipline; and 
• Organising an auction system in an attempt to optimise price trans-
parency for producers and to create a focal point for the market distri-
bution system. 
The Fifth Reason, namely to handle situations of oversupply, has taken 
on a different road as excess supply is less likely, farmers being con-
tracted and markets probably operating more efficiently. The seeking of 
income improvement is likely to assume a more entrepreneurial charac-
ter. Farmers may have to undertake more diversified entrepreneurial 
activities to prevent their rural economy from marginalisation. 
There are a number of cases where co-operatives were transformed into 
corporations to finance future investments. Where the circle of owners is 
expanded with non-user members who also bear risks, this causes the 
original member-user owners to lose influence. However, it also opens 
new ways of entrepreneurship to members in relation to their CF. 
The changing market conditions and their impact on the relationships 
between members and co-operatives can be illustrated by the example of 
flower auctions. Market gardeners invest heavily on their farm enter-
prises and as a result they become more demanding with respect to mar-
keting activities of their CF. Flower auctions, limiting themselves to a 
"price discovery" function, are anable to take an elaborated marketing 
activities. Thus, dynamic and market oriented growers resort to direct 
agreements with private companies, surpassing the co-operative auction. 
From the foregoing is concluded that the historical five reasons for co-
operating have changed their nature quite considerably. The above con-
siderations therefore gave rise to formulating the Sixth Reason. This 
Sixth Reason will lead to new policies concerning the relationship be-
tween the CF and the co-operative member. 
The Sixth Reason - New Generation Co-operatives (NGCs) 
The Sixth Reason represents the need for new member strategies as a 
result of the changed nature of the classical reasons for co-operation. 
In this section the characteristic elements are listed first. Second, 
examples of new member strategies are discussed in order to make the 
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concept more comprehensible. The Sixth Reason in essence is to let CFs 
create new market opportunities for the co-operative members under the 
conditions of investor-driven membership, diversified membership and 
market fragmentation. The Sixth Reason is to make investments in such a 
way that new markets are created in which the members can add value 
with their land, labour, capital investments and skills. The Sixth Rea-
son thus is the combination of the original reasons for co-operation in a 
state of flux. New conditions have stirred farmers to co-operate in new 
ways and have caused long-standing co-operatives to re-engineer. They 
are the so-called New Generation Co-operatives. 
CFs that were set up (Nadeau and Thompson, 1996) for the Sixth Rea-
son are called New Generation Co-operatives. Egerstrom (1996), Cook 
(1996), Nadeau and Thompson (1996) give a number of examples for the 
US, van Dijk (1996) gives examples from The Netherlands. Below some 
characteristic examples are described. 
A group of Saskatchewan grain farmers, all members of The 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP), are faced with a threat of excess 
supply of wheat in the lower quality ranges. Therefore they invest in a 
feed lot of approximately 25.000 head of cattle and a bio-ethanol plant, 
a by-product of which is also used as a feed-component for the beef 
cattle. The farmers hold 56 percent of the shares. SWP holds 22 percent 
and the company in the bio-ethanol business (Mohawk) holds the other 
22 percent (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 Co-maker Co-operative: Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
small group of 
member investors 
North of Regina 
Mohawk 
Bio-ethanol 
SWP 
56% 
22% 
22% 
feedlot 
+ 
bio-ethanol 
tOF, based on 
regional grain 
From the very start the founding farmers decided that they would sell 
their wheat at market prices, but that the shareholders would receive a 
First Right of Refusal to deliver at that price. During the starting period 
all required raw material was delivered by the original 'members'. The 
amount they could deliver was agreed to be proportional to their invest-
ment (shares). Presently this still is the case, but now far more wheat is 
needed than members can deliver. 
As a result of the business structure, the performance of the 'CF' is 
expressed in the value of the shares linked by a wheat-delivery right 
and their dividends. The members have reached their goal: demand for 
feed quality wheat is enhanced and a profit is made. 
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This co-operative is a joint investment activity by farmers. The CF is 
both a market leader and a price leader. New members cannot enter un-
less they buy stock and delivery rights. The Board of Directors elected 
democratically. The other board members are appointed by their share-
holding companies. When questioned, however, it turns out that these 
farmers are presently more interested in expansion and profits than in 
having votes. 
The University of Saskatchewan Centre for the Study of Co-opera-
tives (cited in Cook, 1996) concludes that the New Generation Co-opera-
tives have two common bonds. The first is that their major focus is value 
added processing, representing a departure from the main objective of 
commodity marketing held by their predecessors. "Rather than acting as 
clearing houses for the product, a NGC is restricted to only accepting a 
predetermined amount of product from its members. In fact a 'two-way' 
contract exists between members and the co-operative that requires the 
member to deliver a certain amount of product by the co-operative and 
requires the co-operative to take delivery of this product" (Cook, 1996, 
p. 145). 
The examples of NGCs given by the authors Egerstrom, Cook, Nadeau 
and Thompson all have in common that open membership is not the 
normal rule, except in cases where people in a community co-operate to 
avoid its economic decline. But product oriented co-operatives have the 
system of limited access. Shares are coupled with delivery rights and 
are tradable. There is proportionality in most cases between shares and 
user transactions. Democracy is maintained as much as possible. There is 
no fundamental objection to making profits and to distribute these on the 
basis of share capital. 
In sum, the new co-operatives follow an investor-driven strategy. 'You 
have to pay to play'. There is closed membership, or it is better to say, 
"there are membership-policies controlling entrance in the venture in by-
laws and operating practices (....). The NGCs have resolved issues to co-
operative property rights and 'free rider' memberships, have asset ap-
preciation mechanisms, delivery right mechanisms, proportional pa-
tronage distribution, base equity capital plans" (Egerstrom, 1996, p. 148). 
The Sixth Reason - Re-engineering the Co-operatives 
When the Sixth Reason conditions prevail co-operatives seem to follow 
either of these two routes: the CFs can convert to IOFs in order to gain 
better access to equity and pursue growth policies. There are examples in 
Ireland in which co-operatives members have released their control for 
this purpose. Or the co-operative's member relationships are strength-
ened on a new basis. The latter route is inevitable when market competi-
tion makes the CF too much dependent on the members. It is also inevita-
ble when the members have become too dependent on their CF. In both 
cases the balance of business between member firm (farm) and CF is lost. 
In both cases members ceased to regard the CF as 'their' CF. Nor are they 
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committed through a 'united we stand, divided we fall' attitude to their 
business. Instead members judge the co-operative at its competitive per-
formance vis-à-vis the members as if it was an IOF. This holds 
especially in countries where CFs and lOFs exist in the same market. A 
timely re-engineering and re-inventing policy is then necessary. Interest-
ingly however the CFs begin to value the membership of their clients or 
suppliers. It is increasingly regarded as an asset by the managers rather 
than a nuisance. Below some successful or at least very promising cases of 
re-engineering/re-inventing are described. These are Harvest States 
(USA), The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (Canada), Dumeco (The Nether-
lands), Campina Melkunie (The Netherlands) and Friesland Dairy 
Foods (The Netherlands). 
Harvest States changed its constitutional by-laws to give the co-op-
erative greater flexibility in forming subsidiaries, joint ventures and 
strategic alliances with local co-operatives. Harvest States is trans-
forming to a Holding Company in which farmers-investors-users can par-
ticipate on their own terms. Harvest States thus does not pay so much 
attention to their members as the normal member-users, but as investors. 
The Harvest States Investment Plan provides producers and co-opera-
tives an opportunity to increase their returns from the Harvest States 
food processing operations by investing in 'equity participation units' in 
those areas. Investments would be available on a 'per bushel' basis. 
Capital raised by selling the equity participation units to member-
investors provides a stronger, more feasible financial base, designed to 
improve returns and redemption of exiting member equity. The infusion of 
capital also enables Harvest States to expand existing operations and 
launch new value-added activities. 
The plan is simple. Eligible investors (producers or co-operative of 
producers) invest in a specific Harvest States value-added food process-
ing activity by purchasing equity participation units. This investment 
carries with it a right and obligation for the member-investor to deliver 
the bushels involved to an authorised delivery point, normally a nearby 
member-co-operative or Harvest States facility. So members can choose 
to participate in the earnings of a specific value-added operation. In 
this sense the plan is quite similar to that of Canadian farmers who are 
also member of the Pool. The remaining earnings are divided in the 
traditional way over the member-users of Harvest States (Figure 3). 
Figure 3 Re-engineering the Co-operative Harvest States 
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Equity participation is subject to depreciation and appreciation in value 
and shares are tradable to eligible producers and co-operatives. The 
background of the plan is that Harvest States' overall grain volume has 
increased much faster than its processing capacity. As a result returns 
from these value-added operations have been diluted. 
A second example of re-engineering the co-operative due to the Sixth 
Reason is the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. Faced with ageing member-
ship, few new entrants and world market influences The Pool decided to 
go public. In this way The Pool effectively prevented a large outflow out 
of the agribusiness sector. Besides the new business of members with The 
Pool gives the right to shares options. Here again the proportionality 
principle is introduced. When looking at the present member admini-
stration it can be concluded that The Pool is as close to co-operative prin-
ciples as a co-operative can possibly get given the Sixth Reason. 
The third example is the Dutch Meat Company Dumeco that was re-
engineered in 1995 out of two traditional meat co-operatives and an IOF 
in the meat business. The co-operatives had both been faced with un-
usual market circumstances. Due to over-capacity in the slaughtering 
plants both in The Netherlands and Germany price competition for 
slaughtered hogs grew very intensive. So the situation arose that mem-
bers gave up the balance between delivery right and delivery obligation 
and the obligation required from the CFs to accept the member produce 
was released. The latter situation of course was natural since also the 
CFs were competing intensively for the hogs to be supplied by the mem-
bers. The result was that the co-operatives more or less dissolved. Virtu-
ally no member commitment remained and it became increasingly diffi-
cult to finance the CF from member capital. As the CFs threatened to go 
broke a re-engineering plan was established. 
The result was a merger between the two CFs and a successful smaller 
IOF. The CEO of the IOF became the CEO of the new company. This new 
company was set up as an IOF in which farmer-users of the former CFs 
were invited to become member-investors. This was realised via a new 
co-operative of member-suppliers to Dumeco IOF. The Dumeco co-opera-
tive became the owner of 30 percent of the shares. The other sharehold-
ers consisting of two big co-operatives operating in the feed industries 
(Cebeco and Cehave). The fourth and fifth parties are the IOF and a 
farmers' union. 
The interesting feature of this operation is that the establishment of 
the Dumeco co-operative was very much stimulated by the management 
of the Dumeco IOF. The relationships are based on transaction cost reduc-
tion, investor-owned relations and co-makership between the members of 
Dumeco co-op and Dumeco IOF. New contracts were established stating 
that co-makership has the following elements: 
• Acceptance by the members of Dumeco IOF as a price leader; 
• Delivery contracts where number of pigs to deliver, plant they shall 
be delivered to, and time of delivery are specified in order to achieve 
efficiency in logistics and smooth us of available capacity; 
• Transaction cost reductions by members to be remitted to them; 
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• Dumeco IOF accepted as a leader of the production-marketing system 
concerning quality requirements, time of delivery, place of delivery. 
Profits are distributed in the form of co-maker fees to members on a pro-
portional-to-transaction basis. The co-maker fees are not paid in cash but 
are transferred as certificates of shares. These certificates are transfer-
able among members but in the future non-members can be included 
(Figure 4). 
The fourth example is Campina Melkunie, the largest dairy co-opera-
tive in The Netherlands. As a primary co-operative Campina Melkunie 
has maintained its role as price leader. This CF is managed on the basis 
of adding value to the member produce. This means that members also 
accept the roles of their CF. These risks are expressed in the milk price. 
As the CF requires more long term equity, a new financial product was 
designed in the form of bonds issues by the CF to members. The bonds are 
compulsory and are proportional to the volume of milk delivered. 
However, bonds are transferable, also to non-members. In this way 
Campina Melkunie established market conditions for capital supplied 
by the members without having a situation in which the investor-
relationship between the CF and the member becomes paramount. 
Figure 4 Co-maker Co-operative Dumeco 
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A fifth example is Friesland Dairy Foods (The Netherlands). Becoming 
increasingly internationalised it decided that high milk prices due to 
good results in Asia causes distortion of incentives to farmers. Therefore 
the FDF follows the weighted average of the five best paying dairy 
firms in the country. In other words, foreseeing the Sixth Reason to 
become effective in a few years time also in the milk and dairy sector of 
Europe, FDF decided to anticipate this change. At the same time 
members are invited to become shareholders in the Far East activities. 
In FDF the control is still exerted by members on the basis of milk 
transactions. The unallocated reserves were transferred in the A-shares 
held by the FDF co-operative. Members can have B-shares in the FDF 
IOF without a proportionality-to-milk restriction. B-shares are trad-
able to other milk supplying members only. B-shares have no voting 
power. 
These are examples of co-operatives where the Sixth Reason caused a 
re-engineering. If members are looked at and treated as business partners 
with co-makerships and investment interests they contribute to the co-
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operative firm and can reap the benefits. Membership is no longer undi-
vided. It distinguishes transaction costs and how to minimise these, 
investment relationships and how to secure the returns (on price or en 
capital) and how to build a market organisation to realise continuity of 
the farm and the rural economy. 
Co-operative Principles under the Sixth Reason - What is Left? 
Like theory, co-operative principles are based on long-standing practices 
and experiences. People learned to introduce rules of conduct in order to 
strike a balance between rights and obligations, freedom and risk versus 
commitment and security. 
Open membership and education no doubt had important effects in 
times when co-operatives were locally based and information was scarce. 
The co-operative principles were the outcome of a development towards 
both vertical and horizontal expansion. The co-operatives, at least most 
of them, were product oriented, not capital oriented. Members were seek-
ing countervailing power and access to scarce goods and services. The 
common interest was to maximise the return on the resources owned by the 
members. The tradable product on the basis of the resources was regarded 
as the scarce resource. All other productive factors like labour and capi-
tal were to earn their returns on the basis of a fair price. Fair deals pre-
suppose solidarity and democracy on a one member - one vote basis. If 
people live near subsistence it is important that there is no outflow of 
capital out of the neighbourhood. Instead the capital should remain 'in 
the family'. This is the basis for co-operative banking. 
It seems that under present conditions members start re-engineering 
processes in their co-operatives because the old balances have changed. 
Different markets cause members to become heterogeneous. Farmers con-
trol not only fixed resources but also capital goods with higher rates of 
depreciation and turnover. Risk profiles differ strongly between indi-
vidual entrepreneurs. Consumer pressure also contributes to the disequili-
brium between farmer interests and the CF. For the scarcely populated 
areas it must be added that farmers see the natural end of horizontal ex-
pansion. It is only with new ventures and alliances with companies else-
where that the rural economy can be maintained at satisfactory per-
formance. Therefore NGCs are investor- and system-driven. Such condi-
tions demand that acceptance of entrepreneurial risks are rewarded. 
Thus, there exist closed membership and depreciation and appreciation 
of co-operative shares. 
New balances between solidarity, democracy and competition will 
appear. However, it is likely that a considerable time period will have 
to elapse before we dare to speak of principles of NGCs and re-engi-
neered co-operatives. 
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